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Abstract 
   One of the more remarkable economic success stories of the past two generations has 
been the phenomenal growth of South Korea as an export-oriented economy, one of the 
"Four Tigers" of East Asia . Despite a brief recession in the early 1980s, the Koreans main-
tained nearly double-digit growth for most of the period from 1963 to 1990. Growth slowed 
by half in the 1990s, and Korea was hit by a more severe recession following the Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997-1998, but remade itself as a major technology power in the 
following decade. Added to this widely heralded economic miracle was a kind of political 
miracle in 1987-1988, the establishment of a genuinely constitutional democracy with a 
peaceful transition of power. This paper considers the recent political and economic devel-
opment of South Korea, with reference to scholarly work. It analyzes a selection of key 
political economy literature that attempts to explain Korea's experience. The article exam-
ines scholarship from the 1980s, when Korea emerged as a developmental model.
Keywords: Political economy, Korea, economic development, political transition
Introduction
   One of the more remarkable economic success tories of the past two generations has been 
the phenomenal growth of South Korea as an export-oriented economy, one of the "Four 
Tigers" of East Asia. Despite a brief recession in the early 1980s, the Koreans maintained 
nearly double-digit growth for most of the period from 1963 to 1990. Growth slowed by half in 
the 1990s, and Korea was hit by a more severe recession following the Asian Financial Crisis 
in 1997-1998, but remade itself as a major technology power in the following decade. Added 
to this widely heralded economic miracle was a kind of political miracle in 1987-1988, the 
establishment of a genuinely constitutional democracy with a peaceful transition of power. 
This paper considers the recent political and economic development of South Korea (or ROK)1',
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with reference to scholarly work. It analyzes a selection of key political economy literature 
from the 1980s, as Korea studies scholars first attempted to explain Korea's rapid economic 
and political development, he nation emerged as a developmental model, and the nation began 
its process of democratization. This can provide a baseline point of reference for the Korean 
political economy as it became fuller developed in the past two decades, joining the OECD in 
1995 and restructuring after the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-1998). A second paper will look 
at the literature of the 1990s and first decade of this century, as Korea consolidated its position 
as a developed economy. The two papers will also assess South Korea's future, in light of her 
current economic and political problems.
Korean Political Development 
   Background. Many writers focus either on Korea's economy, or its politics, but in a fast 
developing country it becomes difficult for most to separate the economic from the political. 
Several articles have nonetheless tried to deal exclusively with Korean politics, stressing the 
primacy of the political process as a force in Korean society and the leading role of political 
actors in shaping the Korean economy. A number of these articles search for patterns in 
Korean political development. For example, Ahn Byung-Joon presents postwar Korean politics 
as a series of simultaneous crises (of participation, authority, and legitimacy) that, in combina-
tion with environmental factors peculiar to South Korea, i.e., a tradition of authoritarianism, 
 external interventions, and geopolitical position, have significantly constrained Korea's consti-
tutional development'. 
  Ahn sees a deeper pattern in these periodic crises. First, a regime tries to establish a 
constitutional basis for itself, but over time becomes increasingly authoritarian. Opposition 
parties and students protest, triggering a crisis of participation. Support for the protests grow 
among the masses, causing a crisis of authority. If the military remain neutral in the situation, 
a crisis of legitimacy ensues, and the president has to resign. The interim government cannot 
cope with growing polarization because of factionalism and weak leadership, so the military 
stage a coup, leaving economic leadership to the civilians. As international conditions become 
unsettled, the new president links his continuance in office with national security and seeks to 
extend his term through constitutional amendment. Disputes break out among the ruling elite 
about how to handle the opposition, as new protests arise. This amounts to a "vicious circle" 
where political conflict takes place within the elite, and involvement of wider segments of 
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 society brings chaos. Strong leaders arise out of thenecessity of restoring order, but the inevi-
table collapse of his personal regime once again brings chaos and factionalism'. 
   Ahn Byung-young also stresses the importance of factionalism in Korean politics. He notes 
that Korean parties have functioned more like personal factions than real political parties. 
Most parties have not survived more than two parliamentary elections, and ruling parties have 
usually died with the demise of a particular regime. It was only with the founding of President 
Park Chung-hee's Democratic Republican Party (DRP) in 1963 that any party tried to develop 
a mass base for itself, and the Democratic Justice Party (DJP) of his successor, Chun Doo-
hwan, attempted to create an even greater mass orientation. However, the opposition was 
chronically weak, under-funded and understaffed'. 
   The weakness of parties, Ahn suggests, has been a central fact of postwar Korean politics. 
He tries to prove two "crude" hypotheses about parties. First, political parties have been 
shaped more by "political" factors than by the country's industrialization process. Secondly, 
if parties cannot cope with the impact of that industrialization, the political process breaks 
down. The political process is also under pressure from various crises, especially an "integra-
tion crisis", i.e., the security threat from North Korea, and a chronic crisis of legitimacy due to 
"failure to fully institutionalize democracy". Moreover, each of the five republics in the South 
from 1948 to 1984 experimented with different institutional arrangements. As a result, South 
Korea's political system was characterized by: 1) a lack of peaceful transition, 2) a two-party 
system, and 3) a "hegemonic party system" under the ruling party, even in the absence of clear 
ideological differences between the ruling and opposition parties; the major factor dividing the 
parties has been the ever-present legitimacy crisis.' 
  Political Parties. Parties are not the only tightly controlled political actors in South Korea. 
Park considers the Korean manner of interest representation as a form of corporatism, as 
defined by Schmitter ("a limited number of singular, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered 
and functionally differentiated categories [with] a deliberate representational monopoly...in 
exchange for observing certain [government] controls..."). The clearest example of Korean 
corporatism, he says, can be found in big business peak associations. Those organizations 
created before 1961 consciously courted the government's blessing, while those coming into 
existence after 1961 were largely government creations. Though influential, these organiza-
tions did not control the government because they are generally reactive and spend a large part 
of their time responding to government proposals. The degree of autonomy of business organi-
zations depends on both the government's trategy for handling them and the ideology of the 
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 group.' 
   Korean professional organizations, especially those for higher income professions, also 
tend to align themselves with ministries concerned with their interests. The only exception is 
the Korean Bar Association, which pushed for protection of human rights. Lower income pro-
fessions more successfully evaded cooptation, but have been subjected to more strict controls 
and have had to compete with government-sponsored organizations. Likewise, Korean labor 
unions proved a mixed bag. The government used election procedures to control the Korean 
Federation of Trade Unions (KFTU), the largest peak association of unions. It also employed 
strict labor laws to discourage formation of independent labor unions. Park claims that a de-
gree of independence crept into local unions, and that the Ministry of Labor dealt more effec-
tively with worker complaints in the 1980s. The main purpose of state intervention in labor 
organizations, he asserts, is to control demand articulation and thereby limit union activity.' 
  Corporatism and social interests. Corporatism seems perhaps most apparent in the 
agricultural sector. Almost all farmers in the 1980s belonged to the Federation of Agricultural 
Cooperatives (FAC), which is the only recognized farmer organization. It provided services, 
and operated as a government agency, but did not represent farmers' interests to the 
government. The coops under FACs control had a monopoly on sale of fertilizer, and 
effectively held down commodity prices as the major buyer of farmers' crops. They also 
manipulated credit to support government macroeconomic policies, which often meant they 
provided inadequate loans or compelled repayment when the government ightened credit.' 
Wade, discussed below, elaborates on this notion of the cooptation of farmers. 
  Where Ahn and Park play up the role of parties and interest groups, Steinberg states that 
Korean economic policy flows from "perceived political needs," and he emphasizes that 
patterns of rule peculiar to the various postwar ROK regimes determined the political economy 
of each era. The Syngman Rhee (Lee Sung Man) regime of the 1950s relied on land reform and 
U.S. aid to keep the economy afloat. Rhee unwisely refused to deal with Japan, the nearby 
economic phoenix, and avoided economic planning because he felt it should await what he 
thought was the imminent reunification of the peninsula under his rule. The brief, democratic 
Chang Huh government (1960-1961) had little effect on the economy, but it gave the people a 
"glimpse" of democracy
, and convinced the military that the country was not ready for 
democracy. By contrast, the Park regime (1963-1979) transformed Korea's economy unlike 
anything in postwar Korean history. Park combined traditional authoritarianism with greater 
"administrative capacity" and control of the military
, and thereby centralized direction of the 
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economy and launched his export drive, the latter in hopes of gaining both domestic legitimacy 
and reduced external dependence on the U.S. In the 1980s, Chun pursued basically the same 
export-oriented strategy as Park, but his legitimacy problem was "more profound." Therefore, 
he depended much more on economic performance, and because of socio-economic hanges 
during the Park years, was increasingly forced to confront issues of equity, e.g., declining farm 
incomes, the imbalance in industrial development between Cholla and Kyongsang provinces, 
 and inadequate social services.' 
  The net result of South Korea's postwar political development, Steinberg suggests, has 
been the emergence of three tensions in the political fabric of the nation. The first is centrali-
zation vs. decentralization. Every Korean government tended toward centralization, and 
controlled important sectors of the society through either direct control or cooptation and 
regulation (the only exceptions being business and the Christian community). Nevertheless, 
there were glimmerings of decentralization in the 1980s, as the government gradually 
permitted more elections and political parties have moved away from pure factionalism to 
coalition building.l°' Secondly, the "government-business nexus," through liberal credit 
policies, created a form of private enterprise unique to Korea: the massive, government-
supported chaebol as leaders in the economy. In the late 1980s, the government began to 
liberalize credit policies to favor small-and-medium-sized businesses, and business became less 
dependent on government for both credit and export direction.11' 
  Thirdly, military-civilian relations created a question mark hovering over South Korean 
politics. After adoption of a new constitution in 1987 and relatively free elections for both the 
President and the National Assembly, the military kept quiet. Military influence remained 
strong throughout the government during the Roh Tae Woo administration (1988-1993), but 
military attitudes were not "monolithic" and many younger officers favored moderate 
government policies.12' 
  Where Steinberg is concerned with political patterns of various regimes, Yoo restricts 
himself to the policy process within the government, specifically as manifested in three 
relationships: 1) the President and the National Assembly, 2) the Blue House and the 
ministries, and 3) among different ministries. Basically, he finds that the Korean policy process 
tends to omit important steps. For example, general goal-setting (establishment of what he 
calls "megagoals") was carried out well at the national evel, but "subnational" goals were often 
unclear or "hidden." Problems might be readily identified, but were only selectively addressed, 
and intelligence agencies had priority when disputes occurred. Policy development was 
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somewhat more thorough, but options were derived "spontaneously," the wishes of the Blue 
House took precedence, and implementation strategies were "almost non-existent," and not 
thought out in "real situations." Moreover, even the all-important "megagoals" were often 
"discontinuous" because of the frequent turnover of government over the course of postwar 
politics. Policy goals could be superimposed on national goals, e.g., when the government cut 
back college enrollment in the mid-1960s to forestall student demonstrations, despite need for 
 educated personnel in the country's industrialization drive.l3' 
  The President's office was always the most important actor in the policy process, closely 
supervising all government agencies. Even so, there was continuous rivalry among the 
President's staff, the presidential guard, and the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), 
with the KCIA serving as chief identifier of political problems. However, political parties and 
the legislature became more active in the 1980s.14' Unlike the structural approaches above, 
Kim focuses on the cultural bases on Korean politics. He asserts that kinship and territorial 
interests, along with the importance of leadership in the Korean context (or lineage, locality, 
and mediation), were the key factors shaping Korean politics from the 1960s onward.15'
The Korean Political Economy 
Class changes. Various scholars emphasize the connection between politics and economics, 
or stress the primacy of economics over politics. An example of the latter is an article by 
Hamilton and Tanter, which lays out the major socioeconomic hanges in the Korean economy 
from the mid-1960s. The first of these changes is "the rise of the working class." The 1980s 
witnessed the resurgence of unofficial unions, as unions joined opposition to the Chun regime. 
Labor became more sophisticated in its methods, and workers now saw themselves as a 
distinct class. Both the government and the workers accepted the idea of minimum wages, and 
health, safety, and employment security emerged as important issues.' 
   A new middle class, crucial to both the student movementand the mainstream opposition, 
also began to view itself as a distinct social entity. Many of the newly affluent resented the 
government-derived benefits accruing to the capitalist class. Most of the students who demon-
strated against the military regime were middle class children who interpreted traditional 
Confucian ideals as promoting activism and moral responsibility. The middle class was also the 
social base of the main-line opposition, which divided into a parliamentary party and a broad 
opposition coalition. There was constant ension between the party and the coalition, since the 
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party did not wish to be associated with the more radical demands of the component groups of 
the opposition: labor, students, churches, and intellectuals. This was one of the reasons why 
opposition leaders Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam split with the main opposition 
Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) to form the New Korean Democratic Party (NKDP) in 
 1987.17 
  The rise of the laboring and middle classes was a domestic phenomenon, while other 
changes occurred in South Korea's economic relations with the outside world. The altered 
international perception of Korea's position, combined with growing dependence on foreign 
markets, put pressure on Korea's export-based economy. For export industries to remain 
competitive, labor costs could grow only so much. Dearer labor costs forced Korean industry 
into higher value-added production, but also put Korean industry in direct competition with the 
advanced industrial countries (AICs). The government was also concerned about labor 
militancy, over-concentration of production in a handful of companies, and the ROK's external 
debt.18' 
  Another external tension that dominated Korean thinking from the beginning was the 
security threat from the North. Militarization of the society gave a justification for economic 
development, just as it provided the coercive power by which the state so effectively 
functioned. The ROK also derived much prestige for its key role in U.S. containment policy, 
which of course implied a distinctly junior role for South Korea in the bilateral relationship. 
However, the perceived decline of regional U.S. hegemony in the 1980s caused the Korean 
government to reconsider the alliance, and so the relationship became "more fluid and open to 
... bargaining." Accordingly, military planners had to focus on military self-reliance, as 
nationalist complaints about the American-dominated command structure gained a better 
hearing.19' 
  Economic policy and BA regimes. Other writers suggest that economic affairs are in the 
saddle and ride Korean politics. For example, Soh outlines what he calls the "political business 
cycle" in which election dates were selected by the government o take advantage of favorable 
economic onditions. He draws a relationship between economic variables and political events, 
and asserts that inflation was the most significant variable explaining both student demonstra-
tions and labor disputes. He also states that labor disputes and student demonstrations did not 
have an effect on each other.20' 
Unlike Soh's economic determinism, Im relates politics and economics within a well-known 
theoretical model of political science. Examining O'Donnell's concept of bureaucratic 
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authoritarianism (BA) in the Korean context, he asks why a BA regime came about in the ROK 
 during the early 1970s, and in the process reformulates O'Donnell's model. O'Donnell had sug-
gested that BA regimes arise due to structural changes in dependent capitalist economies, par-
ticularly when bottlenecks occur. The BA regime then becomes a "functional requirement" if 
the economy is to move beyond ISI to "deepening" of the industrial structure, i.e., heavier ISI 
industrialization. There have been, he notes, many critiques of O'Donnell's ideas; Serra, for 
example, shows that BA regimes are not necessarily the most efficient means for achieving 
growth and other economic objectives.21' 
Im suggests more prosaic political explanations can be given for the imposition of BA 
regimes. Economic crisis occurs when class conflict cannot be effectively compromised. 
Democracy is often weak in dependent capitalist countries, with the industrial bourgeoisie a 
creature of the state and the working class under a form of corporatist control. If an "authori-
tarian power bloc" throws out an election, the legitimation function of democracy is destroyed, 
and the power bloc may feel free to move toward more direct authoritarian controls over the 
economy.22' The changing Korean class structure of the late 1960s--referred to by Hamilton 
and Tanter above--made compromise difficult. The unlimited supply of labor ended with the 
decline of migration from rural areas to the cities. Demands for higher wages and popular 
activism in the 1971 election seemed to threaten the export path, and the kind of suppression 
of labor that the government deemed necessary would have been incompatible with the 
restricted democracy then in place. 
  The power bloc set up a BA regime to preempt opposition to the export-oriented economic 
strategy adopted only a few years before. The necessity to the ruling elite of the export-
oriented route became apparent with the heady growth of the late 1960s. Neither the local 
bourgeoisie, dependent for its position on the state export program, nor the working class, 
consisting at that point of "social marginals" from the countryside, was yet in a position to 
challenge imposition of a BA regime. The state, meanwhile, remained "overdeveloped" 
because of the continuous military threat from the North. The military-led regime of the 1960s, 
moreover, thought it had a mandate to carry forward the export platform strategy. To the Park 
government, then, a BA regime seemed like the only choice, and so it promulgated its Yushin 
(Revitalization) constitution that gave almost unlimited power to Park.23' 
Like Im, Wade stresses politics as a determinant of both economic policy and economic 
result. Wade says that Korean economic success was not necessarily a vindication of neo-
classical economic nostrums. Rather, it was the result of conscious state economic policy in 
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support of the security policy of the nation. There are two primary manifestations of state 
economic policy. The first is creation of a single capital market for all of South Korea. 
Subjected to administrative control in the domestic market and at the mercy of the govern-
ment-monopolized bank sector, companies were not independent units of capital, but parts of 
a "One Capital." As such, they were expected to use their resources in support of national 
 objectives. 
   Complementing "One Capital" was "One Farm." Government pricing decisions and use of 
the Saemaul agricultural movement as a tool to gain compliance with government objectives 
constrained individual farmers' decision making ability. South Korean farmers, Wade claims, 
were like South Asian tenant farmers because of the "multistranded relationships with a single 
landlord" and the "system of interlinked markets and resource domains."24' 
   Like Park, Wade paints the Korean administrative process as one producing essentially 
cooptation of interests, in this case the farmers. The Farmland Improvement Associations 
(FLIA) were his prime examples of such cooptation. Farmers were excluded from its opera-
tions, and did not feel that they have influence on the organizations. Appointments to impor-
tant positions were made from above, and there was a rigid hierarchical control of FLIA 
operations. Nonetheless, because of a strong sense of groupishness in the organizations and 
absence of differentiation with farmers, local bureaucrats tried both to protect themselves 
against pressure from above and to deal fairly with the farmers.2j'
Discussion 
  In the end, what can be said about the South Korean political economy? The pre-1990 
literature on the Korean political economy raises a number of vital questions that must be 
answered before one can adequately characterize the Korean political economy---and that is 
why the period is a useful baseline for the analysis of the 1990s and beyond. For instance, is 
there a general pattern of South Korean political and/or economic development? If so, does this 
constitute a Korean "model"; is such a model unique, or can it be applied elsewhere? Does 
Korean experience really amount to success? If so, how can one explain this success? Which 
has been a more important driving force in postwar Korean politics, politics or economics, or 
are the two integrally related? Due to space limitations, two topics are most important to the 
Korean economy before 1990: patterns of the political economy and the Korean economic 
model. 
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 1. Patterns of the pre-1990s Korean  Political Economy. A. In favor of patterns. Can one 
distinguish patterns in Korea's politics or economy, if by pattern one means a repeating set of 
occurrences? Some of the authors cited here think so. Ahn Byung-Joon most clearly sees a 
pattern at work in South Korean politics, with its recurrent crises, dominant environmental 
factors, and persistent factionalism. A government, he says, makes a limited effort at 
constitutionalism, which is undermined by an increasingly autocratic president. Student riots 
lead to a crisis of participation, or when other sectors join the students, a crisis of legitimacy 
ensues and the president makes a hasty exit (or alternately, internal factionalism leads to the 
assassination of the president). A brief democratic government is not able to cope with spread-
ing polarization, and the military step in to restore order. Under a new strongman, the 
economy takes off, but unfavorable international conditions make the president feel he must 
solidify and extend his tenure by amending the constitution. Students riot again, and the 
process repeats. 
   At a certain level, this pattern describes Korean political development--with variations, of 
course--from the late 1950s to 1987. Ahn deftly sketches major Korean political developments 
of the past thirty years, but methodological problems with his pattern are immediately obvious. 
First, the pattern does not explain, it merely describes events. Secondly, it does not even 
describe what happened prior to, say, 1955 or since 1987; because it is inapplicable to any 
other time period, and the pattern repeats but once, it is no pattern. Thirdly, the pattern itself 
is only skeletal, in any case. The heart of the matter resides in the "revolution" of 1960-1961 
and the events of 1979-1980; while sharing certain common elements, such as student riots, 
broad opposition, short-lived democracy, and military intervention, these two set pieces of 
post-Korean War history differed in fundamental ways. For example, the 1979 round was 
triggered by an assassin's bullet, not students' Molotov cocktails, and the most notable act of 
opposition, the Kwangju Uprising, was part of a regional dispute with rival Kyongsang 
Province and the central government. 
   Other authors avoid the trap of over-generalization by restricting themselves to specific 
issues. Steinberg skirts any mention of above patterns, and simply contrasts the styles of the 
various postwar regimes. Yoo limits himself to description of patterns he perceives in the 
policy process, and Kim restricts his discussion to mostly intangible traditional factors, such as 
kinship and territorial interests. Ahn Byung-young's analysis of parties is a stimulating survey 
of their role in South Korean politics, and his sketch of the institutional patterns in the five 
Korean republics echoes Steinberg. His characterization of the South Korean political process 
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as lacking peaceful transition, having only two parties, those parties being dominated by a 
single "hegemonic party," and both parties riven with personalist factions, fits Korean realities 
up to 1987. 
   B. Alternative voices. Most damaging to Ahn's argument is the existence of more rigorous 
 alternative xplanations. The best one examined here is Im's application of O'Donnell's bureau-
cratic authoritarian approach to South Korea. Im's article is masterful: following a simple intro-
duction of O'Donnell's basic scheme, he briefly presents the most telling criticisms of it and 
necessary amendments to it; he then lays out three simple reasons for the advent of bureau-
cratic authoritarianism in the ROK. Essentially, the "power bloc" under Park felt that it had to 
preempt potential opposition because the end of the labor surplus had made compromise with 
the proletarianized labor force difficult and the mainstream opposition began to demand redis-
tribution programs that could threaten the export-oriented economic strategy. 
   Similarly, Park's application of Schmitter's corporatist paradigm (applied to Latin 
America) to South Korea is pregnant with analytical possibilities. Analysts have long looked to 
Latin America (and to a lesser extent southern and central Europe) as the expected arena of 
fulfillment of corporatism, ignoring other areas of the world. Park makes an excellent case for 
at least partial corporatism in the Korean state's manipulation of peak associations. Business 
and labor organizations have been particularly effective instruments for carrying out state will. 
Of course, this began to break down with the advent of the democratic Sixth Republic in 1988. 
   In perceiving patterns in postwar South Korean politics, analysts are on the same shaky 
ground as historians who profess to find cycles that connect ancient dynasties with modern de-
mocracies. It is usually better to describe and analyze particular events for what they are than 
to generalize from them to all history. Unfortunately, the state of domestic Korean social 
science may not have attained the level of analysis employed by Im and Park. Authors such as 
Ahn fails to rise above gross generalization and national solipsism. Korea scholarship of the 
1990s gradually moved away from leftist analysis, though world systems theory remained 
popular among scholars in Korea. As Korea democratized, the BA concept never caught on. 
  2. The Korean Model. A. The liberal model. In any case, it is probably easier to talk about 
South Korea's economics than its politics. Economics yields much clearer empirical evidence: 
by most conventional economic measures, conditions were vastly better in South Korea in 1989 
than in 1960. Even such prominent non-capitalists as Mikhail Gorbachev conceded the spec-
tacular economic performance of South Korea, as well as the usefulness of Korea's experience 
as an economic model. There have been at least four explanations for this generally conceded 
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success. The first, the neoclassical approach mentioned by Wade and the favorite of political 
conservatives, asserts that Korean performance is a simple working out of liberal economic 
 principles. The second, discussed by Im and well worked by leftist economists and political 
scientists, contrarily suggests that South Korean is one of the most obvious examples of 
dependent economic development. The third, hinted at by Steinberg says, no, both left and 
right are wrong, and Korea's development has all been due to state orchestration through an 
autonomous bureaucracy, using such tools as allocation of capital. The fourth insists that the 
conditions that gave rise to the South's post-1960 progress were unique and unrepeatable, 
especially the legacy of Japanese colonialism, the infusion of U.S. aid and advice in the 1950s, 
the over-development of the ROK state due to the ever present security threat since the 
Korean War, the well-educated and motivated populace, and the cooking world economy of the 
1960s and early 1970s. Which one provides the most effective analysis? Korean economic 
performance has been due at least partially to each of these factors, and perhaps others. 
Acceptance of these ideas depends on one's academic discipline and ideological perspective on 
the "Korean miracle." A better question is which one has been more dominant in the literature. 
The statist approach dominated political science literature before the Asian Financial Crisis, 
and then underwent serious questioning. Neoclassical or free market approaches among econo-
mists were similarly questioned in the wake of the crisis. 
B. Refinements to the liberal model. What do the authors discussed here add to this 
argument? Mostly, they provide refinement, but no major departures. Hamilton and Tanter, 
for example, paint some of the recent trends and "contradictory political pressures" arising 
from Korea's economic success. Foremost among them are the the increasing presence of the 
working class, the creation of a vibrant middle class and its importance to the opposition and 
student protests, and continued dependence on the international economy along with success 
and affluence. Along with these socioeconomic strains came various economic and security 
bilateral frictions with Korea's long-time big brother, the U.S. Hamilton and Tanter suggest 
these trends have subtly altered Korean politics, but do not attempt o predict how these devel-
opments would change the Korean political environment of the 1990s. 
  The Steinberg article is a bit more balanced. To be sure, he only touches on the major 
economic changes of the past thirty years, principally the industrialization of the nation, the 
rise of per capital incomes, the shifting of employment from agriculture to industrial produc-
tion, and the jump from ISI to EOI. His discussion of political tensions in 1988 also differs from 
Hamilton and Tanter, and he focuses on what he considers the three most serious issues facing 
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Korea: centralization versus decentralization, government-business relations, and military-
civilian relations. However, he does list a few of the issues with which Korean politics came to 
grips in the 1990s, i.e., security, trade and investment, foreign debt, and international prestige. 
   Hamilton-Tanter and Steinberg really do not have much new to add, though their pieces 
are well argued. Wade, however, presents the most provocative thesis of the above economic 
authors. Though his study ostensibly concerns itself with irrigation and agricultural policy in 
South Korea, he widens his focus to the entire political economy of the ROK. His notions of 
"One Capital" and "One Farm" accord with statist explanations of Korean performance
, while 
their originality mark them as concepts that may prove useful in other national cases. His 
discussion of bureaucratic procedure parallels Park's examination of Korean corporatism and 
echoes Yoo's dissection of the top-heavy policy process. 
   Soh's approach also is an original contribution. He courageously examines the links 
between economic performance and political behavior. While his explication of the concept 
"political business cycle" is quite muddled
, while he mixes conceptual apples and oranges, i.e. 
government-planned actions such as elections and more spontaneous behavior such as strikes 
and student demonstrations, and while he never really proves his assertion that such a cycle 
really exists, some of the relationships he draws may fertilize future research on Korea. For 
example, he concludes that inflation may be the most important economic variable influencing 
both worker strikes and student demonstrations. It may not be appropriate to suggest as he 
does that these economic variables definitely explain Korean political behavior, but their influ-
ence may be important. Soh's research presaged much work of the past decade on Korean 
politics, as scholars looked for links between Korean electoral politics and economic behavior.
Conclusion
  South Korea in the 1980s. South Korea of the late 1980s was in a curious position. It was 
wildly successful in the international economy, but comparatively few people had written 
seriously about its politics or economics, let alone its political economy. It was a highly devel-
oped country, yet still considered part of the Third World and not quite part of the First. It 
shared many developmental features with Japan, yet was also one of the perennial Cold War 
hot spots, a divided nation like Germany, and a continuing defense commitment (or burden, de-
pending on one's point of view) for the U.S. Among developing nations, it was one of the most 
egalitarian, but it is also among the most highly dependent on international finance and trade. 
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It prided itself on democratic forms, and yet experienced authoritarian rule for most of the 
forty-plus years the Republic of Korea had been in existence. With such contradictions in 
mind, the unalloyed economic miracle of Korea appears a bit less one dimensional. 
  As indicated above, there are at least four schools of thought on the Korean economic 
"success." Which has provided the most useful analysis? It is probably more appropriate to ask 
which one is less or more right. For the pre-1990 period, as Wade notes, the neo-classical 
explanation may be the least useful explanation, since the Korean economy was in many ways 
carefully controlled by the state. South Korea's economy was relatively free, but the heavy 
hand of the state planning and finance guided the economy from the beginning, and the 
dependent nature of pre-1990s Korean development must be conceded. Scholars of the 1980s 
moved beyond the simplistic notions of liberal economics put forward by the World Bank and 
other international organizations as applied to East Asian development. By contrast, while 
statism and dependency may have more explanatory power than the Neoclassical approach, 
their inherent determinism limits their theorization. The Korea-is-unique explanation, combin-
ing as it does minimal explanation with eclectic selection of factors for analysis, has the virtue 
of flexibility, but it ignores the key insights contained in the other three approaches. Clearly, 
one needs a more universal explanation that takes in all four approaches. Perhaps this can be 
had with even further eclecticism, focusing on the words "political" and "economy" in political 
economy: Korea is one of the best examples showing how the developmental process depends 
on both politics and economics. 
  Political economic approaches to South Korea. Based on the readings presented here, how 
does one begin the task of broadening the political economic approach to Korea? First, there 
 is need for more and better concepts applied to Korea. Im's application of the Latin American 
BA concept to Korea is an excellent example of the kind of work that applies lessons of 
comparative development to Korea. The ROK may well be unique in many ways, but it shares 
elements of political economic patterns of behavior with the rest of the world. Why not, then, 
borrow concepts and measuring tools applied to other countries? Secondly, there is a strong 
need for more of the kind of sectoral study carried out by Wade for agricultural policy through-
out the Korean economy. Much has been written about the Korean macro-economy, but not a 
great deal about the micro-economy. The Korean macro-economy depends to a large extent on 
the micro-economy, but until Wade we knew little about it. As Hamilton-Tanter and Steinberg 
note, the 1980s were times of great change in Korea; one wonders what was going on among 
the new working and middle classes they only briefly describe? Recent scholarship has more 
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fully looked at changing Korean values as the economy has matured. Thirdly, the peaceful 
transition of power in 1987-1988 brought a sea change in postwar political development. 
  Applications to other developing economies. Finally, there was a crying need for more 
analyses comparing Korean development o that of other nations. During the same period, a 
few authors compared South Korea with Taiwan due to perceived similarities. Koo compares 
the two countries by suggesting that both the Korean and Taiwanese economic successes have 
been molded by the "interplay" of the international economic system, class structure, and the 
role of the state. Of these, he says, the state has been the most important, but the function of 
the state cannot be understood apart from the other two factors. He also indicates that depend-
ency has operated in these two countries differently than in Latin America, depending espe-
cially on geopolitics. For example, both countries were largely Cold War creations of the U.S. 
 Moreover, both states were relatively strong vis-à-vis  society, and the class structures of both 
have been much more egalitarian than in Latin America. Increasing industrialization also trans-
formed the class structure by spawning a working class and a state-sponsored bourgeoisie.26' 
Other articles, such as by Chan and Clark, focus exclusively on Taiwan. Chan suggests that the 
Taiwanese state has been successful at playing off Taiwan's international weakness by trading 
ideological allegiance with the West for market access and avoidance of protectionism.27' Clark 
outlines the state-directed "structural transformations" of the Taiwanese economy from the 
1950s to 1970s, specifically 1) land reform in the early 1950s, 2) import substitution in the late 
1950s to early 1960s, 3) export-oriented industrialization from the mid-1960s to 1970s, and 4) 
movement oward high technological industrialization since the 1970s. The Kuomintang-led 
government promoted limited democratization along with industrialization.28' 
  Also, more attention needs to be paid to the democratic transition of the late 1980s. 
Developments before, during, and especially after the decisive moments in summer, 1987 need 
to be carefully analyzed. One of the few studies of Korea's democratic transition is an edited 
volume by Kim and Kihl, but these do little more than describe the events of 1987-1988 and 
add a helping of postwar political history. An article by Kihl, for example, is basically a 
straightforward rendering of events as they happened, with brief mention of a few factors that 
made a difference: 1) the personalities of the "three Kims" (Kim Dae Jung, Kim Young Sam, 
and Kim Jong Pil, who were the key leaders of the 1990s) and Roh Tae-woo, 2) regionalism, 
especially the age-old Cholla-Kyongsang feud, and 3) urbanization.29' Another article by Kihl 
describes the breakdown of constitutional revision in 1986 as a prelude to the drive for a new 
constitution the next year.80' Dong draws a parallel between the relative ineffectiveness of 
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student unrest and the division of opposition forces in 1987 and the failure of the 1960 revolu-
tion. Specifically, in 1987 the students could not translate their early success against the Chun 
regime into a link-up with the mainstream opposition, and the opposition wasted time and 
energy on the factional dispute between Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, thereby losing 
 the presidential election.31' Subsequent scholarship would examine this breakdown in terms of 
competitive regionalism and game theory.3' 
  South Korea enjoyed phenomenal growth from the 1960s to 1980s, yet its politics have 
shifted only at the end of this period, prompting what Calder calls economic growth with politi-
cal stagnation. Like Taiwan, Korea in the 1990s haltingly entered a new era of affluence with 
democratization. Along with the major socio-political changes came a more rigorous scholarly 
examination of the Korean political economy. The analyses of the 1990s and beyond present 
a more nuanced and skeptical approach to the Korean economy, and will be discussed in the 
second part of this paper.
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